Often entrepreneurs and investors agree to governance mechanisms that resemble joint control -neither agent has dominant control of the firm, and corporate decisions unspecified in the initial contract are made only with the approval of both agents. This contradicts theoretical predictions that joint control is suboptimal, except under some limited circumstances. I develop a theoretical model to explain the optimality of joint control. I model a wealth-constrained manager who raises funds from a venture capitalist. The manager has a preference for aggressive strategies that preserve her control rents, while the VC has a preference for conservative strategies that yield financial returns quickly, and require less effort to manage and monitor. I show that joint control is the optimal governance mechanism when the following circumstances are met: (a) the firm has a risky return distribution under the aggressive strategy; (b) the manager's human capital is critical for the firm's success; (c) the VC's liquidity constraints, and cost of managing and monitoring the firm are high; and (d) the firm has a reasonable collateral value. Later-stage start-up firms in high-tech sectors like software, telecom and biotechnology fit this description. *
Introduction
When the manager of a start-up firm raises funds from an outside investor to finance the firm's investments, who should have control, i.e., the right to make corporate decisions that cannot be specified precisely in the initial contract? There are interesting differences between practice and theory.
In practice, managers and investors often agree to governance mechanisms that resemble joint control -neither the manager nor the investor has dominant control over the firm, and corporate decisions unspecified in the initial contract are made with the approval of both the agents. In their analysis of venture capital (VC) contracts, Kaplan and Stromberg (2001) find that in 61% of VC-financed firms, neither the VC nor the founder manager controlled a majority of the board seats. 1 Since the other members of the board are chosen by the mutual consent of the manager and the VC, this means that neither the manager nor the VC has exclusive authority to make decisions. In fact, the VC and the manager had majority control of the board in only 25% and 14% of firms, respectively. Evidence of joint control has also been found in joint ventures in the US and China. Hauswald and Hege (2002) find that two-thirds of the two-parent joint ventures in the US have 50-50 equity allocations. Cai (2003) reports that in an overwhelming majority of Chinese joint ventures, key corporate decisions can only be made with the unanimous approval of both partners.
This evidence contradicts a strong prediction in the theoretical literature that joint control is suboptimal, 2 except in some limited circumstances. Moreover, the limited circumstances under which joint control is predicted to be optimal, do not match the characteristics of start-up firms that receive VC financing.
In this paper, I develop a theoretical model to explain the optimality of joint control. I model the problem of the entrepreneur-manager of a start-up firm who obtains funds from a venture capitalist. I assume that the initial contract between the manager and the VC is incomplete, i.e., the timing and nature of some important corporate decisions cannot be described in detail in the initial contract. For example: Should the firm go for an IPO or a private sale to a larger rival? Should it invest in R&D or in upgrading its marketing infrastructure? Should it undertake a major expansion or not? So the initial contract assigns control, or the right to make these corporate decisions, either to one of the agents (individual control) or to both the agents simultaneously (joint control). When control is jointly assigned to the manager and the VC, corporate decisions can only be made with 1 With start-up firms, the authority to take most of the important corporate decisions rests with the board; hence, board control is the key measure of control (See Lerner (1995) and Stromberg (2001,2002) .)
2 The property rights literature (see Hart (1995) ) predicts that joint control is sub-optimal because it hurts the incentives of both agents to make relationship-specific investments. Aghion and Bolton (1992) suggest that manager control achieves the same outcome as joint control, but at a lesser renegotiation cost; hence joint control can never dominate manager control.
butions, with a high probability of weak returns and a small probability of extremely high returns. In high-tech sectors like IT/ software, telecom and biotechnology, the manager's human capital is critical for the firm's success. Since these firms are generally involved in developing a new product or service, there is considerable uncertainty surrounding the firm's business model, market conditions, etc.; so the cost to the VC of managing and monitoring the firm is high.
The "collateral requirement" further suggests that it is more likely to be a later-stage firm than an early start-up venture. Early start-up firms are typically less than a year old, and are still at the product development or prototype testing stage (see Sahlman (1990) ); hence, they are unlikely to have much in the form of collateral. In contrast, later-stage firms are those that have a product with some proven market potential. These firms generally have high sales growth, but are either unprofitable or marginally profitable, and require external capital to finance further expansion. Later-stage firms generally have collateral in the form of patents, marketing rights of existing products, fixed assets, inventories and receivables that might be seized in the event of liquidation.
These predictions are consistent with empirical evidence on the characteristics of firms that receive VC financing. Close to 70% of the firms that receive VC financing are in high-tech sectors like IT/software, telecom and biotechnology; the remaining 30% are in the healthcare, retail and other sectors (Kaplan and Stromberg (2001) ). It is also true that a large percentage of VC financing goes to later-stage firms. Sahlman (1990) reports that only 15% of the capital disbursed by VCs went to ventures in early stages, whereas 65% was invested in later-stage firms; the remaining 20% was invested in leveraged buyout or acquisition deals.
For joint control to be optimal, it is necessary that the threat of liquidation, in case the manager and the VC fail to reach an agreement, is perceived to be credible. Such a threat can be made credible by providing the VC with a redemption right, i.e., a right to demand that the firm redeem its liquidation claim. 3 If the manager is unable to meet the redemption demand, the VC gets the right to liquidate the firm. Kaplan and Stromberg (2001) report that redemption rights are present in 79% of all VC contracts they survey, with a typical maturity of five years.
So the paper also offers an alternative explanation for the presence of redemption rights, namely, that they safeguard the bargaining power of the VC in future negotiations. Previous explanations of redemption rights have appealed to the abandonment option associated with debt financing. But as Kaplan and Stromberg (2002) note, "the abandonment option argument does not apply well to redemption rights that apply more than five years into the future." This is because poorly performing firms are generally liquidated in under four years.
Discussion of related literature: The property rights literature predicts that joint ownership 4 is suboptimal, except under some limited circumstances. Hart (1995) predicts that joint ownership is optimal when the returns from the investments made by the two agents are embodied in the physical capital of the firm, rather than in the human capital of the agents. On the contrary, I show that joint control is the optimal governance mechanism only when the manager's human capital is critical for the firm's success; if manager's control rents are low, then manager control is feasible and optimal. Cai (2003) and Hauswald and Hege (2002) derive the optimality of joint ownership in a setting where two agents make relationship-specific investments that are non-contractible. Cai (2003) argues that when agents face a tradeoff between relationship-specific investments and general investments to promote their outside options, joint ownership acts as a mutual hostage, and promotes cooperation by committing the agents to the relationship. However, this does not explain the prevalence of joint control in VC-financed firms, because contracts between VCs and managers generally include mechanisms like non-compete clauses, time vesting of stock options etc. to restrict the manager's outside options, and to commit her to the relationship. Hauswald and Hege (2002) show that when agents face a tradeoff between investment and control rent seeking activities, 50-50 ownership may be optimal because it offers protection against rent seeking activities. In my paper, the focus is on the conflict of interests regarding future decisions, rather than the agents' investments in the venture. 5 The optimal control arrangement is determined by the firm's financial constraints, rather than by the attributes of the agents' investments into the firm. This paper is also related to a number of studies that focus on the allocation of control rights in VC contracts. Berglof (1994) analyzes how an entrepreneur and a VC may allocate control rights so as to mitigate the distributional conflicts associated with a future sale of the firm. Hellmann (1998) analyzes the circumstances under which an entrepreneur voluntarily relinquishes control to a VC, including the right to fire the entrepreneur. In a model with double moral hazard, Cestone (2001) looks at the interaction of cash flow rights and control rights in VC contracts, and explains why riskier VC claims are often associated with weak VC control rights. In contrast to this paper, all the above mentioned papers treat control as an indivisible right that is held exclusively by the manager or the VC. Kirilenko (2001) treats control as a continuous rather than a binary variable. Using a signaling framework, Kirilenko (2001) shows that VC control is increasing in the level of asymmetric information between the VC and the entrepreneur. However, his results are based on the assumption that the entrepreneur derives an exogenous utility that is increasing in her degree of control over the firm. I do not make such an exogenous assump-tion. Instead, my paper focuses on the endogenous relationship between control allocation, decision making, sharing of surplus, and overall firm value.
The Model
The model incorporates three dates; 0, 1 and 2. At date 0, an entrepreneur-manager sets up a firm by making an investment I. Being cash constrained herself, the manager raises this money from a venture capitalist (VC) by issuing claims against future cash flows of the firm. The cash flow from the firm, denotedx, is a random variable whose distribution on some positive interval X is determined by a future strategic decision to be made by the firm.x is realized at date 2.
The strategic decision is modelled as an action choice a, where the firm chooses between two actions; a 'risky' action a r and a 'safe' action a s . For example: the firm may have to choose between an IPO and a private sale to a larger rival; it may have to choose between investing in R&D and investing in marketing infrastructure; it may have to decide whether to undertake a major expansion or not, etc.
The risky action is so named because the distribution ofx under this action, unlike under the safe action, depends on a state variable θ that is not known to either the manager or the VC at date 0. The state θ is realized only at date 1. It may be viewed as summarizing the impact of factors such as the firm's technology, business model, market conditions, etc., that have a bearing on the profitability of the action a r . θ can have two possible realizations; 'high' or 'low', denoted θ h and θ l . The expected cash flow at date 2 when the firm chooses action a r is π rh if the 'high' state is realized, and π rl if the 'low' state is realized. The expected cash flow when the firm chooses action a s is π s , irrespective of state θ.
The project is sufficiently complex that the timing and nature of the future strategic decision cannot be described precisely at date 0. This is because outside parties, such as a court, cannot verify the realization of state θ and the timing of the action choice a. This assumption has the following implications: First, the initial contract cannot specify an action plan contingent on θ. Second, the contract also cannot include a clause to prevent the firm from choosing an action prematurely (i.e., before θ is observed). So the initial contract must specify which agent has control, i.e., the right to choose a. Control may be assigned exclusively to either the manager or the VC, or it may be assigned jointly to both agents. I discuss control allocations in greater detail in Section 2.
At date 0, both the manager and the VC believe that the 'high' state will be realized with probability q, where q ∈ (0, 1) is a constant. When θ is realized at date 1, it is observed by both the agents. Thus, there is never any information asymmetry between the two agents. The action a and the cash flowx are verifiable ex-post. Thus the initial contract can specify a rule for sharingx that is contingent on the action chosen.
The manager and the VC are risk-neutral in their payoffs. While the VC is primarily interested in its monetary returns from the project, the manager also cares for her control rents. Control rents may be viewed as the non-pecuniary or otherwise non-contractible part of the future firm value that can accrue only to the manager, and cannot be seized by the VC. 6 They include less tangible things such as specific human capital, R&D capabilities, reputation, size, etc. that the manager cares for. I assume that the manager derives control rents valued at C > 0 when action a r is chosen, and zero otherwise. For example: The manager prefers an IPO to an acquisition because she will be the CEO of an independent firm after an IPO, while she may be replaced or relegated to a less important position following an acquisition; she prefers investing in R&D because that would boost her reputation among her peers; she prefers a larger expansion because a larger firm offers greater managerial perquisites and prestige.
Assumption 1: The following conditions hold:
The firm value is the sum of cash flows and the (monetary value of) manager's control rents. Assumption 1(a) says that firm value is maximized by choosing action a r in state θ h and action a s in state θ l . I refer to this as the efficient action plan. Assumption 1(a) implies that, in state θ l , the manager may be reluctant to choose the efficient action, as she forgoes her control rents, C, by doing so. Assumption 1(b) says that, in state θ h , the firm's cash flows are also maximized by choosing the efficient action a r .
The analysis in this paper is simplified by defining,
∆ v and ∆ denote the incremental value and the incremental cash flow, respectively, to the firm from choosing action a r over action a s in state θ h . Assumption 1(a) implies that ∆ v > 0, and Assumption 1(b) implies that ∆ > 0. Overall, Assumption 1 says that the efficient action in each state also maximizes the cash flow in that state. If this were the end of the story, the first-best action plan could be implemented by giving the control right to the VC (see Aghion & Bolton (1992) ). 7 However, recall that the initial contract cannot contain a clause that prevents the safe action a s being forced on the firm prematurely. When the VC is in control, it can force the safe action a s irreversibly on the firm, before θ is revealed. To make the VC's choice nontrivial, I assume that the VC bears a cost m for forgoing the opportunity to force action a s early on. m represents the following costs: (i) the opportunity cost of forgoing early liquidity by not forcing action a s early on, 8 and (ii) the cost that the VC expects to expend on continuing to manage and monitor the firm. 9 I refer to m as the VC's opportunity cost of control.
Assumption 2: q∆ < m < q∆ v .
Assumption 2 says that the incremental value if the firm waits for θ to be revealed, and then chooses the efficient action, is higher than the VC's opportunity cost of control; however, the incremental cash flow from doing so is less than the VC's opportunity cost of control. In other words, it is inefficient to choose a s prematurely, but the VC may still do so because it doesn't care for the manager's control rents C, and wants to save on its own opportunity cost m.
The VC's preference for choosing action a s early arises from its own liquidity constraints and the high cost it expends to manage and monitor the firm; the parameter m captures this preference. These costs arise due to the nature of the partnerships that VCs float to raise funds from investors such as pension funds, insurance comapnies, etc., and due to the structure of the partnership agreements. 10 First, partnerships have finite lives; so the VC must raise a new partnership once the funds from an existing partnership are fully invested, or about once every three to five years, in order to remain in business. So the VC has to divide its time and resources between monitoring existing portfolio firms, and raising new funds for making future investments. Second, the earlier the VC generates returns for its existing investors, the more likely it is that they will participate in future partnerships floated by the VC. Third, a large part of the VC's compensation is in the form of a percentage share, typically 20%, of the realized gains of the partnership. So the earlier the gains are realized, the better it is for the VC.
If θ were verifiable, the firm could have been directed to implement the efficient action plan. The expected firm value would then have been: Gompers (1995) reports that firms that went for an IPO were held for a longer time, and required more intense monitoring than firms that were acquired. Fenn, Liang and Prowse (1995) report that VCs may prefer private sale because it yields immediate liquidity, even though an IPO could result in a higher valuation for the company.
9 Kaplan and Stromberg (2002) report that, while investing in small companies, most VCs worry that the monitoring costs and involvement costs may be too high. While VCs regularly play a monitoring and advisory role, they do not intend to become too involved in the company. Gorman and Sahlman (1989) , Lerner (1995) , Hellmann and Puri (2000) and Hellmann and Puri (2002) provide evidence that VCs spend substantial time and effort managing and supporting their investments.
10 See Fenn, Liang and Prowse (1995) and Sahlman (1990) .
The expected cash flow from the firm when the efficient action plan is chosen is qπ rh + (1 − q) π s . For financing to be viable, this must compensate for the investment I and the VC's opportunity cost of control, m.
As discussed earlier, the initial contract cannot specify an action plan contingent on the state θ. It can only assign control, i.e., the right to choose action a. I distinguish between two forms of control -individual control and joint control.
Individual control: Under individual control, the initial contract provides one of the agents -the manager or the VC -with the right to choose the action a. After observing the true state θ, the two agents might wish to renegotiate the initial contract. During renegotiation, the manager and the VC bargain over the action choice and cash flow rights. If renegotiation succeeds, action a is chosen by mutual consent, a new contract detailing fresh cash flow rights is signed, and the old contract is discarded. If renegotiation fails, the agent with the control right chooses the action that will maximize her payoff as per the cash flow rights laid down in the initial contract. So the initial contract defines the disagreement point of the renegotiation game; even if it is discarded, it is still not irrelevant ex-ante.
Joint control: Under joint control, action a can only be chosen by the approval of both agents. I model this as follows: If the manager proposes an action and the VC doesn't intervene, it is assumed that the VC approves of the manager's action choice. The manager and the VC then share the cash flow,x, as specified in the initial contract. Otherwise, if the VC intervenes, the manager and the VC bargain over the action a and the sharing of surplus. The two agents face the threat that in case they fail to reach an agreement, the firm is liquidated, and both agents receive their respective liquidation claims. If liquidated, the firm yields a value L < π s . L is the collateral value of the firm, or the value of the firm's assets outside the firm. The payoffs to the manager and the VC in case of liquidation are L − Y and Y , respectively, where Y denotes the liquidation claim of the VC. Limited liability requires that 0 ≤ Y ≤ L.
As discussed in the introduction, the threat of liquidation can be made credible by providing the VC with a redemption right maturing at date 1, i.e., a right to demand that the firm redeem its liquidation claim at date 1. If the manager is unable to meet the redemption demand, the VC gets the right to liquidate the firm. In case the manager and the VC fail to reach an agreement, the VC exercises its redemption right. Since the firm has no cash flows prior to date 2, the manager cannot make the repayment; so this triggers liquidation of the firm.
The initial contract specifies cash flow rights, liquidation claims and the control allocation.
• Cash flow right: This is a function S : X * {a s , a r } → X, where S (x, a i ) denotes the payoff to the VC when the firm chooses action a i andx = x. The manager being the residual claimant gets x − S (x, a i ). Limited liability requires that 0 ≤ S (x, a i ) ≤ x for all x.
• Liquidation claim: This is a variable Y ∈ [0, L], where Y denotes the payoff to the VC in the event of liquidation; the manager gets L − Y .
• Control allocation: This is a variable ψ ∈ {V, J, M }, where V, J and M stand for VC control, joint control and manager control, respectively.
The triple (S, Y, ψ) denotes the initial contract. Let S rh and S rl , respectively, denote the VC's expected payoffs when the firm chooses action a r in the 'high' and 'low' states. Similarly, let S s denote the VC's expected payoff when the firm chooses action a s .
Let E (S,Y,ψ) (V ) and E (S,Y,ψ) (S) denote the expected firm value and the expected cash flow to the VC, respectively, under the contract (S, Y, ψ). For simplicity, I assume that the manager gets to propose a contract to the VC, which the VC can either accept or reject. This implies that the manager obtains cash equal to E (S,Y,ψ) (S) from the VC at date 0. (This assumption simpifies analysis without affecting the qualitative results in this paper)
The manager's problem is max
subject to the financing constraint,
where φ is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the VC waits till θ is revealed, and 0 if the VC chooses action a s prematurely. If the financing constraint is not met, the manager will not be able to raise enough money at date 0 to finance the investment I; the contract is then said to be infeasible.
Renegotiation design
In this section, I analyze the renegotiation game between the manager and the VC at date 1. During renegotiation, the manager and the VC bargain over the action choice and sharing of cash flows. As mentioned earlier, renegotiation can take place irrespective of whether control is held by the manager or by the VC, or by both the agents jointly. The control allocation only determines the disagreement point, i.e., the outcome of the bargaining game in case the agents fail to reach an agreement: under individual control, the agent who is in control chooses the action that will maximize her payoff as per the cash flow rights laid down in the initial contract; under joint control, the firm is liquidated, and both agents receive their respective liquidation claims. I show that the efficient action plan is always implemented under manager control and joint control. The efficient action plan is also implemented under VC control, if the VC waits till θ to be revealed. When the manager has control, she agrees to choice of action a s in the 'low' state, because her share of the renegotiation gains more than compensate for her lost control rents. Under joint control, the threat of inefficient liquidation causes both the agents to agree to the efficient action plan.
I model the renegotiation game between the manager and the VC as a Rubinstein game of alternating offers: Players make or respond to offers only at times t in the infinite set T = {0, 1, 2...}. At t = 0, the manager makes an offer which the VC can either accept or reject. In the event of rejection, the game proceeds to t = 1, at which time, the VC makes an offer. If the manager rejects the offer, game proceeds to t = 2, and so on. Let δ denote the time gap between times t and t + 1.
An offer in this game, denoted κ, takes the form (a i , (π i + C i − s, s)). It consists of an action choice a ∈ {a s , a r } and a payoff plan (π i + C i − s, s), where π i and C i denote the cash flow and control rents generated under action a i . 11 The payoffs to the manager and the VC if the offer is accepted are π i + C i − s and s, respectively. 12
To complete the description of the game, the disagreement point needs to be specified. The disagreement point, denoted D, is the outcome of the game if every offer in every time period is rejected. Under joint control, in case of failure to reach an agreement, the firm is liquidated. Therefore, Let u m (κ, t) and u vc (κ, t) denote the utilities of the manager and VC respectively if the offer κ is accepted at time t. u m (κ, t) and u vc (κ, t) are defined such that u m (D, .) = u vc (D, .) = 0, i.e., the manager and the VC value the payoffs they obtain over and above what they would obtain under the disagreement option.
ρ m and ρ vc are constants satisfying 0 < ρ m , ρ vc < 1. ρ m and ρ vc are referred to as the discount factors of the manager and the VC, respectively. They capture the impatience of the two players to reach an agreement sooner than later.
It is a well known fact that the structure of the Rubinstein game is asymmetric, i.e., the outcome of the game is different if the order of the players is reversed; 13 the player who proposes first has an advantage over the other player. The higher the δ, the more asymmetric is the game. The game becomes more and more symmetric as δ → 0. For convenience, I assume that δ 0, although the results in this paper do not require this assumption.
Lemmas 1 and 2 below describe the subgame-perfect equilibrium (SPE) outcomes of the renegotiation game under the different disagreement points.
Define ρ andŶ as follows,
Lemma 1 (SPE outcome of the renegotiation game with
The bargaining game has a unique SPE. In state θ l , the VC and the manager reach an immediate agreement on action a s ; their respective payoffs are
In state θ h , the VC and the manager reach an immediate agreement on action a r ; their respective payoffs are π rh − max Ŷ − Y, 0 and max Ŷ − Y, 0 + C.
Proof. Please see appendix
In state θ l , the manager and the VC agree on the choice of action a s . The surplus from reaching this agreement is π s − L. The renegotiation game determines how this surplus is divided. This situation is similar to two players bargaining over the division of a dollar. Just as in the "divide the dollar" game, this game too has a unique SPE in which the VC and the manager reach an immediate agreement on splitting the surplus π s − L; their respective shares of this surplus are ρ (π s − L) and (1 − ρ) (π s − L). The VC's payoff consists of its payoff under the disagreement option, Y , plus ρ (π s − L), and similarly for the manager.
13 See Chapter 3 in Osborne and Rubinstein (1990) Notice that, as expected, ρ is decreasing in ρ m and increasing in ρ vc . 14 So as the manager becomes more patient relative to the VC, she captures a higher fraction of the surplus.
In state θ h , the manager and the VC agree on the choice of action a r . The surplus from reaching this agreement is π rh + C − L. However, owing to the wealth constraint of the manager, a part of this surplus, consisting of control rents C, cannot be shared with the VC. In the unique SPE of this game, the VC's payoff is Y + ρ (π rh + C − L) or π rh , whichever is lower.Ŷ is the value of Y at which Y + ρ (π rh + C − L) equals π rh . So if Y is higher thanŶ , the VC captures the entire cash flow π rh ; the manager's payoff is her control rent C. Simple algebra shows that the VC's payoff can be written as π rh − max Ŷ − Y, 0 .
Lemma 1 has the following important implications: First, joint control implements the efficient action in both states θ l and θ h . Second, the higher the VC's liquidation claim, Y , the higher (weakly) is its payoff. So liquidation claims, backed by the ability to force liquidation, enhance the VC's bargaining power under joint control. Other determinants of the VC's bargaining power are the relative values of the impatience parameters, ρ m and ρ vc . However, unlike the liquidation claim Y , these are exogenous parameters in this paper.
Lemma 2 below describes the equilibrium outcome of the following renegotiation games: (a) a game in which, in case of failure to reach an agreement, the firm chooses action a s , and (b) a game in which, in case of failure to reach an agreement, the firm chooses action a r . DefineŜ
Lemma 2 (a) SPE outcome of the renegotiation game with D = (a s , (π s − S s , S s )):
The game has a unique SPE. In state θ l , the VC and the manager reach an immediate agreement on action a s ; their respective payoffs are S s and π s − S s . In state θ h , the VC and the manager reach an immediate agreement on action a r ; their respective payoffs are π rh − max Ŝ − S s , 0 and max Ŝ − S s , 0 + C.
(b) SPE outcome of the renegotiation game with D = (a r , (π rj − S rj + C, S rj )) in state θ j : The game has a unique SPE. In state θ h , the VC and the manager reach an immediate agreement on action a r ; their respective payoffs are S rh and π rh − S rh +C. In state θ l , the VC and the manager reach an immediate agreement on action a s ; their respective payoffs are S rl +ρ (π s − π rl − C) and π s −S rl −ρ (π s − π rl − C).
Consider the renegotiation game in which, in case of failure to reach an agreement, the firm chooses action a s . This situation arises when the VC has control, and the terms of the contract are such that it will choose action a s in the absence of renegotiation. 15 In state θ l , 14 ρ can be written as
1+
|log δvc | |log δm | ; |log δm| and |log δvc| are decreasing in δm and δvc, respectively, because δm, δvc < 1.
15 Alternatively, this situation can also arise if the initial contract explicitly directs the firm to choose action as in case of disagreement.
there is no scope for welfare improvement through renegotiation. This is because the VC will anyway choose the first-best action a s . In state θ h , renegotiation is welfare improving. The VC and the manager agree to a new contract and the firm chooses action a r . The surplus from reaching this agreement is (π rh + C − π s ), which is shared by the VC and the manager. As explained above, not all of this surplus can be shared.
In the unique SPE of this game, the VC's payoff is S s +ρ (π rh + C − π s ) or π rh , whichever is lower.Ŝ is the value of S s at which S s + ρ (π rh + C − π s ) equals π rh . So if S s is higher thanŜ, the VC captures the entire cash flow π rh ; the manager's payoff is her control rent C. Simple algebra shows that the VC's payoff can be written as π rh − max Ŝ − S s , 0 .
Next, consider the renegotiation game in which, in case of failure to reach an agreement, the firm chooses action a r . This situation arises when the manager has control, and the terms of the contract are such that she will choose action a r in the absence of renegotiation. 16 In state θ h , there is no scope for welfare improvement through renegotiation. This is because the manager will anyway choose the first-best action a r . In state θ l , renegotiation is welfare improving. The VC and the manager agree to a new contract and the firm chooses action a s . The surplus from reaching this agreement is (π s − π rl − C), which is shared by the VC and the manager; their respective shares of this surplus are ρ (π s − π rl − C) and (1 − ρ) (π s − π rl − C). The VC's payoff consists of its payoff under the disagreement option, S rl , plus ρ (π s − π rl − C), and similarly for the manager.
Optimal Control Allocation
An optimal control allocation is one that is feasible and maximizes the firm's value. Since the firm's value is maximized by implementing the efficient action plan, a control allocation is optimal if it is feasible and implements the efficient action plan. Note that feasibly implementing the efficient action plan is sufficient, but not necessary, for a control allocation to be optimal. As discussed in Section 5.1, for some firms, no control allocation can implement the efficient action plan. In this section, I discuss the circumstances under which the different control allocations can feasibly implement the efficient action plan.
The main findings in this section are as follows: Manager control implements the efficient action plan, but is feasible only if the firm is expected to generate enough cash to compensate the manager for her control rents and also compensate the VC for its investment in the firm; this requires a low C and a high q. VC control is efficient only if the VC's liquidity costs and monitoring costs are low, because otherwise it is impossible to dissuade the VC from choosing the safe action prematurely. Joint control implements the efficient action plan, but is feasible only if the firm has sufficient collateral. Overall, joint control is the optimal governance mechanism when the return distribution under the aggressive strategy is risky, manager's control rents are high, VC's liquidity costs and monitoring costs are high, and the firm has a reasonable collateral.
Manager Control
When the manager is in control, she may be reluctant to choose the efficient action a s in state θ l , unless she obtains compensation for the control rents C that she forgoes by doing so. Such compensation may be provided to her in the initial contract; the manager then chooses a s in state θ l without necessitating renegotiation. Alternatively, the manager extracts her compensation for control rents C during ex-post renegotiation. A renegotiationproof contract provides the manager with cash flow rights of at least C for choosing action a s ; this implies that the VC gets at most π s − C in state θ l . Even if the initial contract is such that the manager's payoff is higher under action a r in state θ l , the contract will be renegotiated at date 1, and the firm will choose action a s . Lemma 2(b) tells us that the VC's payoff after renegotiation is at most (1 − ρ) π rl + ρ (π s − C). Since π rl < π s − C (Assumption 1(a)) and ρ < 1, the VC's payoff after renegotiation in state θ l is less than
So under any contract with manager control, the VC's expected payoff is at most K m . Clearly if K m < I + m, the firm cannot raise enough money at date 0 to finance the investment I, by offering a contract with manager control. This result is stated in Lemma 3.
Lemma 3 Manager control is feasible if and only if K m ≥ I + m. Whenever manager control is feasible, it implements the efficient action plan.
The condition K m ≥ I + m can be rewritten as qπ rh + (1 − q) π s ≥ I + m + (1 − q) C. So manager control is feasible only if the firm has sufficient financial slack, i.e., only if the firm is expected to comfortably generate enough cash flow to compensate the manager for her control rents, and also compensate the VC for its investment. This condition is unlikely to be met for firms with low q and high C. A low q means that the firm has a risky return distribution under the aggressive strategy a r ; there is a high probability that the 'low' state will be realized. A high C implies that the manager's human capital is critical for the firm's success.
These predictions are consistent with the empirical evidence on manager control in VCfinanced firms. Kaplan and Stromberg (2001) report that the manager controlled a board majority in only 14% of all such firms they survey. Most VC-financed firms are start-up firms in high-tech sectors like information technology, telecom and biotechnology, that fit the description of a low q and a high C. Empirical and anecdotal evidence indicates that such firms generally do not have sufficient financial slack to support manager control. Sahlman (1990) reports that more than one-third of the investments made by VC funds result in absolute loss, and more that two-thirds result in a realized return of less than 10% per annum. More importantly, even firms that eventually succeed may be cash-strapped in the short-term. 17 When K m ≥ I + m, the efficient action plan can be implemented by the following contract with manager control: S (x, a r ) = x, S (x, a s ) = πs −C πs
x, and Y = L. Under this contract, the manager gets a constant payoff of C irrespective of the action chosen. So the manager chooses the efficient action in both states. 18 This pattern of cash-flow rights and liquidation rights can be implemented by financing the venture using convertible preferred shares (or convertible debt), with the conversion ratio contingent on the action choice. Thus, the VC obtains higher cash flow rights if the firm chooses action a r .
VC Control
When the VC is in control of the firm, it may force the safe action on the firm prematurely in order to save on its opportunity cost m. The VC's expected cash flow, if it waits for θ to be revealed, is qS rh + (1 − q) S s . So it will choose action a s prematurely if S s > qS rh + (1 − q) S s − m, i.e., if S s > S rh − m q . The manager can renegotiate with the VC and offer to increase S rh in order to persuade the VC to wait till θ is revealed. However, if S s > π rh − m q , renegotiation cannot succeed, and the VC chooses a s prematurely. Therefore, VC control is efficient only if S s ≤ π rh − m q . Define
For any contract with VC control that implements the efficient action plan, the expected payoff to the VC cannot exceed K vc . So if K vc < I +m, it is not possible to design a contract with VC control that will implement the efficient action plan. This result is stated formally in Lemma 4.
Lemma 4 VC control can implement the efficient action plan if and only if
The condition K vc ≥ I+m can be rewritten as qπ rh +(1 − q) π s ≥ I+m+(1 − q) m q − ∆ . Recall that m q − ∆ > 0 (Assumption 2). So the requirement K vc ≥ I + m may not be met for firms with low q, low ∆ and high m. A low ∆ means that the incremental cash flow from choosing the agrressive action over the safe action in the 'high' state, is low. A high m implies that the VC's liquidity constraints and monitoring costs are high. All else equal, the lower the q and ∆, and the higher the m, the more likely it is that the VC will choose the safe action prematurely. The only way to dissuade the VC from choosing action a s prematurely is to reduce its payoff under action a s ; but then, the VC's expected payoff may be so low that it will refuse to invest in the firm at date 0.
When the condition K vc ≥ I + m is met, then the following contract with VC control can implement the efficient action plan: S (x, a r ) = x, S (x, a s ) = Since S s ≤ qS rh + (1 − q) S s − m, the VC will not force action a s on the firm prematurely. Since S rh > S s , the VC will choose action a r in state θ h . Lastly, π rh − m q > π s −C (Assumption 2) and π s − C > π rl (Assumption 1(a)) imply that S s > S rl ; so the VC will choose action a s in state θ l . In other words, the VC waits till θ is revealed, and then chooses the efficient action in both states. As noted in the discussion following Lemma 3, this pattern of cash-flow rights and liquidation rights can be implemented by financing the venture using long-term convertible preferred shares (or convertible debt), with the conversion ratio contingent on the action choice. Finally, m < q∆ v (Assumption 2) implies that K vc > K m . So whenever manager control is feasible, the efficient action plan can also be implemented by giving control to the VC. Moreover, there might be firms for which K vc ≥ I + m > K m ; for such firms, manager control is infeasible but VC control can implement the efficient action plan. This result is stated as a corollary to Lemmas 3 and 4.
Corollary 5 (to Lemmas 3 and 4) K vc > K m . So manager control cannot strictly dominate VC control.
Joint Control
When the control right is held jointly by the manager and the VC, the VC cannot choose action a s prematurely as the manager will not allow it to do so; 19 the firm then waits till θ is revealed. In state θ l , the VC gets a payoff of Y + ρ (π s − L) if it intervenes, and a payoff of at most π s − C if it doesn't (see discussion preceding Lemma 3). So in state θ l , the VC's payoff is at most L + ρ (π s − L) or π s − C, whichever is higher.
The above discussion shows that under any contract with joint control, the VC's expected payoff is at most K j . So if K j < I + m, the firm will not be able to raise enough money at date 0 to finance the investment I, by offering a contract with joint control. Lemma 6 states this result.
Lemma 6 Joint control is feasible if and only if K j ≥ I + m. Whenever joint control is feasible, it implements the efficient action plan.
Lemma 6 implies that joint control is feasible if and only if the firm has sufficient collateral value. This is because K j is increasing in L. The higher the L, the more likely it is that the condition K j ≥ I + m is met. Also notice that
So whenever manager control is feasible, so is joint control, but not vice-versa.
When the condition K j ≥ I + m is met, the efficient action plan can be implemented by the following contract with joint control:
In state θ h , the manager chooses the efficient action a r ; the VC does not intervene, and gets a payoff of π rh . In state θ l , the VC intervenes if and only if
This pattern of cash flows and liquidation claims can be implemented by financing the firm with convertible debt or convertible preferred shares with face value equal to L, with a redemption right for the VC maturing at date 1. The crucial difference between joint control on one hand, and manager control and VC control on the other, is that the VC can now threaten to force liquidation of the firm at date 1. Of course, as shown in Lemma 1, liquidation never occurs; it is the credibility of the threat that matters.
Joint control vs. individual control
When control is held by the manager, the manager needs to be rewarded for choosing action a s in the 'low' state, in the form of a compensation for the control rents she forgoes. When control is held by the VC, the VC needs to be punished for choosing action a s , in order to dissuade it from choosing action a s prematurely. So under both forms of individual control, the VC's payoff under action a s must be low if the efficient action plan is to be implemented. At the same time, the expected payoff to the VC must be high enough to persuade it to invest in the firm. These two conflicting objectives may be difficult to reconcile for firms with low q, high C and high m.
Joint control, on the other hand, doesn't require punishing the VC (or rewarding the manager) in order to implement the efficient action plan. The reasons are as follows: First, faced with the threat of inefficient liquidation, the manager cannot insist on obtaining compensation for her control rents before agreeing to the choice of action a s in the 'low' state. Second, the VC cannot choose action a s prematurely because it needs the consent of the manager to do so, failing which the firm will wait till date 1. The only issue then is whether the expected payoff to the VC is high enough to persuade her to invest in the firm, or not. As shown earlier, this depends on the firm's collateral, L. The higher the L, the more likely it is that joint control is feasible.
Consider a firm for which K vc < I + m. Then, VC control cannot implement the efficient action plan (Lemma 4). Moreover, manager control is also infeasible (Corollary 5). Suppose the firm has enough collateral that K j ≥ I + m. Then joint control is feasible and implements the efficient action plan (Lemma 6). For such a firm, joint control strictly dominates both VC control and manager control.
Proposition 7 below examines the circumstances under which joint control strictly dominates individual control. Define
Proposition 7 The requirement that I + m must lie in the interval (K vc , K j ] (Condition 2) is obvious from the discussion above. But, for this to be possible, K j must exceed K vc . Since K j is increasing in L, K j > K vc if and only if L exceeds the threshold L vc defined above (Condition 1).
Some explanatory comments regarding Proposition 7: First, the lower the q and ∆, and the higher the m, the lower is the threshold L vc ; hence, the more likely it is that the firm's collateral exceeds the threshold L vc . As discussed earlier following Lemma 4, low q and ∆, and a high m also make it more likely that I + m > K vc . Second, m < q∆ v (Assumption 2) implies that m q − ∆ < C. So m q − ∆ can be large only if C is large. Third, the greater the difference (L − L vc ), the wider is the interval (K vc , K j ]; hence, the more likely it is that I + m lies in this interval.
To summarize, joint control strictly dominates individual control when the following conditions are met: (a) the firm has a risky return distribution under the aggressive strategy (low q), (b) the manager's human capital is critical (high C), (c) the VC's liquidity constraints, and cost of managing and monitoring the firm are high (high m), and (d) the firm has a reasonable collateral value (L > L vc ).
As argued in the introduction, a start-up firm in a high-tech sector such as software, telecom or biotechnology fits the description in conditions (a) through (c) above. The "collateral requirement" further suggests that it is more likely a later-stage firm than an early start-up venture. Later-stage firms are those that have a product with some proven market potential. These firms generally have high sales growth, but are either unprofitable or marginally profitable, and require external capital to finance further expansion. Laterstage firms generally have collateral in the form of patents, marketing rights of existing products, fixed assets, inventories and receivables that might be seized in the event of liquidation.
Overall, the discussion in this section can be summarized in terms of the parameters K m , K vc and K j as follows: If K m ≥ I + m, the initial contract can assign the control right to the manager. However, if K m < I + m, the manager will either have to share control with the VC or give away control to the VC altogether, depending on whether K j or K vc (or both) is greater than I + m. If max {K m , K vc , K j } < I + m, then manager control and joint control are infeasible, and VC control cannot implement the efficient action plan. The only option then is to implement the inefficient action plan by giving away control to the VC altogether.
Contingent Control
So far, I have assumed that contracts may not be made contingent on θ, as it is not verifiable. In this section, I consider the possibility that contracts may be made contingent on a verifiable signal γ ∈ {l, h}, that is imperfectly correlated with θ. I use the modified notation S γ (x, a), Y γ and ψ γ to denote cash flow rights, liquidation rights and control rights contingent on the signal γ.
For simplicity, let Pr (γ = h|p = p h ) = α = Pr (γ = l|p = p l ), where α is a constant satisfying 1 2 < α < 1. The variable α measures the informativeness of the signal γ. The higher the α, the more informative is γ regarding the state θ; α = 1 2 means that γ is completely uninformative, while α = 1 means that γ is a perfect proxy for θ.
Let q l (α) denote the posterior probability that the 'high' state will be realized, after γ = l has been observed.
As expected, q l (α) < q, and q l (α) is decreasing in α. In other words, when the signal γ is very precise, γ = l most likely means that the 'low' state will be realized.
i.e., it is efficient to choose action a s without waiting for θ to be revealed. But, the efficient action plan was defined as waiting for θ to be realized, and then choosing action a r in the 'high' state, and action a s in the 'low' state. In order to keep the definition of efficient action plan consistent with the earlier sections, I assume that:
Consider the control allocation ψ h = M, ψ l = V , i.e., the manager has the control right, but if γ = l is realized, control switches to the VC. A well known result from Aghion and Bolton (1992) is that when manager control is infeasible and VC control is inefficient, then the control allocation ψ h = M, ψ l = V may be the optimal governance mechanism for the firm. In this section, I examine how the control allocation ψ h = M, ψ l = V compares with joint control.
Remark 8 When manager control is infeasible and VC control is inefficient, the control allocation ψ h = M, ψ l = V cannot feasibly implement the efficient action plan. This is a fairly obvious result. A 'low' realization of the signal γ means that there is a higher probability of the 'low' state being realized. So if the VC cannot be dissuaded from choosing the safe action prematurely given its prior beliefs regarding θ, it cannot be dissuaded from choosing the safe action after observing a 'low' realization of γ. An immediate implication of Remark 8 is that when joint control strictly dominates individual control, it strictly dominates the control allocation ψ h = M, ψ l = V as well. So when the conditions in Proposition 7 are met, joint control is the strictly optimal governance mechanism for the firm.
Second-best Firm Value
Consider a firm for which max {K j , K vc } < I + m. Then manager control and joint control are infeasible, and VC control cannot implement the efficient action plan. Moreover, Remark 8 says that the control allocation ψ h = M, ψ l = V also cannot implement the efficient action plan. So the optimal firm value, V * , cannot be achieved. This is because when the VC is in control, it forces the safe action on the firm prematurely.
When the efficient action plan cannot be implemented, the next best thing that the firm can do is to implement the second-best action plan. Consider a contract that gives control to the VC if γ = l is realized. Under the second-best plan, the VC chooses action a s without 20 This assumption does not mean that the optimality of joint control vanishes if α > α * . When α > α * , the definition of the efficient action plan itself changes. So, V * , Km, Kvc, and Kj will also change. Joint control could still turn out to be the optimal governance mechanism. However, as α → 1, the control allocation ψ h = M, ψ l = V (contingent control) will dominate joint ontrol.
waiting for θ to be revealed whenever it is in control. To see why this is inefficient relative to the efficient action plan, consider the event (θ = θ h , γ = l). Under the efficient action plan, the firm would have chosen action a r after observing θ = θ h , but under the second-best plan the VC chooses action a s after γ = l is realized. So in the event (θ = θ h , γ = l), the firm's value is π s under the second-best plan, instead of π rh + C under the efficient action plan. Define
V sb is the firm's expected value when the second-best action plan is implemented. I refer to V sb as the second-best firm value. Notice that V sb < V * , and that the difference V * − V sb is decreasing in α. This is because the more precise the signal γ, the less likely is the event (θ = θ h , γ = l).
The second-best action plan can be implemented by a control allocation in which control switches to the VC only following a 'low' realization of the signal γ. Two such control allocations are: ψ h = M, ψ l = V and ψ h = J, ψ l = V ; in the latter allocation, control is jointly held by the manager and the VC, but the VC gets exclusive control if γ = l is realized. I refer to the control allocation ψ h = J, ψ l = V as partial joint control.
(
Under the control allocation ψ h = M, ψ l = V , the manager retains control of the firm if γ = h. So the manager has control in the event (θ = θ l , γ = h). Then, as discussed in Section 4.1, the manager chooses action a s , and the VC's payoff is at most π s − C. The event (θ = θ l , γ = h) occurs with probability (1 − q) (1 − α). So when the control allocation ψ h = M, ψ l = V implements the second-best action plan, the VC's expected payoff cannot exceed K mv .
Similarly, under the control allocation ψ h = J, ψ l = V , control is jointly held by the manager and the VC in the event (θ = θ l , γ = h). Then, as discussed in Section 4.3, the efficient action a s is chosen, and the VC's payoff is at most max {L + ρ (π s − L) , (π s − C)}. So when partial joint control implements the second-best action plan, the VC's expected payoff cannot exceed K jv .
A contract that implements the second-best action plan is feasible only if the VC's expected payoff exceeds I + [qα + (1 − q) (1 − α)] m. Recall that the VC incurs the cost m only when the firm waits for θ to be revealed. Under the second best plan, when the VC is in control, it chooses action a s without waiting for θ to be revealed. So the cost m is incurred only if γ = h is realized, because then the VC is not in control; this occurs with probability qα + (1 − q) (1 − α).
Lemma 9 (i) The control allocation ψ h = M, ψ l = V can implement the second-best action plan if and only if K mv ≥ I + [qα + (1 − q) (1 − α)] m.
(ii) Partial joint control can implement the second-best action plan if and only if
Lemma 9 says that when the efficient action plan cannot be implemented, it might be possible to implement the second-best action plan if α is sufficiently high, i.e., if the signal γ is precise enough. Notice that K jv ≥ K mv . So partial joint control dominates the control allocation ψ h = M, ψ l = V ; the dominance is strict only when
In other words, partial joint control strictly dominates the control allocation ψ h = M, ψ l = V only when the manager's control rents are high, and the firm's collateral exceeds the threshold L m .
Finally, if K jv < I +[qα + (1 − q) (1 − α)] m, neither partial joint control nor the control allocation ψ h = M, ψ l = V can implement the second-best action plan. The only option for the manager then is VC control, even though that is inefficient.
Conclusion
The main result in this paper is that, for some firms, joint control is the optimal governance mechanism. Under joint control, neither the manager nor the investor has an exclusive authority to make corporate decisions that haven't been specified in the initial contract; such decisions are made with the approval of both agents. In this respect, joint control resembles the governance mechanisms found in many VC-financed firms, where neither the manager nor the VC control a majority of board seats.
The paper emphasizes the relationship between firm characteristics -like, the return distribution, manager's control rents, and the firm's collateral -VC's liquidity constraints, and the optimal governance mechanism. I find that joint control is the optimal governance mechanism when the following circumstances are met: The firm has a risky return distribution under the aggressive strategies. The manager's human capital is crucial for the firm's success. The VC's liquidity constraints, and cost of managing and monitoring the firm are high. Lastly, the firm has some collateral in the form of fixed assets, marketing rights of existing products, patents, etc., that can be seized in the event of liquidation. Later-stage start-up firms in high-tech sectors fit this description.
This result is important because the control rights literature predicts that joint control is suboptimal, except under some limited circumstances that do not match the characteristics of VC-financed firms, that exhibit evidence of joint control. On the other hand, the circumstances that I identify in this paper match the characteristics of firms that receive a large part of overall VC financing.
Finally, the results in this paper suggest avenues for future empirical research. The results suggest that joint control is more likely to be optimal in high-tech start-up firms over start-up firms in other industries, in firms developing innovative products/ services over others, and in later-stage firms over early-stage start-up firms. These are empirically testable predictions. The relationship between governance structure of a start-up firm and future performance, choice of exit route etc. also need to be examined empirically.
following condition must hold,
Solving equations (11) and (12), we obtain,
Using L'Hospital rule,
Claim 11 In the stationary SPE (σ * r ,σ r ), the manager always proposes κ * = (a r , (π r − s * r + C, s * r )) whenever it is her turn to propose, and accepts any offer (a, (π a + C a − s, s)) proposed by the VC if and only if π a +C a −s ≥ π r +C −ŝ r ; the VC always proposesκ = (a r , (π r + C −ŝ r ,ŝ r )) whenever it is its turn to propose, and accepts any (a, (π a + C a − s, s)) proposed by the manager if and only if s ≥ s * r . The outcome is that the manager proposes κ * at t=0, which the VC readily accepts. If δ → 0, s * ŝ π r − max Ŷ − Y, 0 , whereŶ
Proof. The players' strategies under the stationary SPE (σ * r ,σ r ) are similar to that under (σ * s ,σ s ) above. I now characterize s * r andŝ r . It must be true that s * r ,ŝ r ≤ π rh + C − L + Y , because otherwise the manager will be better off under the disagreement option where her payoff is L − Y . Combining this with limited liability, we require s * r ,ŝ r ≤ min {π rh , π rh + C − L + Y } ≡ s u .
(i) If the VC rejects an offer at t=0, it proposesκ at t=1, which the manager accepts. Therefore, for the VC's rejection strategy to be credible it must be that ρ δ vc (ŝ r − Y ) > s−Y , for all s < s * r . Similarly, for the VC's acceptance strategy to be credible, it must be that
Since u vc (., t) is continuous, we conclude that,
(ii) Similarly, for the manager's rejection and acceptance strategies to be credible,
Let's conjecture thatŝ r is interior (need to verify this later). Then, solving the system of equations (13) and (14),ŝ
Applying L' Hospital rule, we obtain that,
We still need to verify thatŝ r < s u .
Claim:ŝ r < s u if and only if (15), it is then obvious thatŝ r ≥Ŷ + ρ (π rh + C − L) = π rh , which can't be. Therefore, s r = s u = π rh , in this case. (Sufficiency) Suppose Y <Ŷ . Now, it is obvious from equations (15) 
This concludes the proof of sufficiency. Proof. (of Lemma 2(a)) Given D = (a s , (π s − S s , S s )). In state θ l , by the same argument used in the proof of Lemma 1, it is evident that the two players agree on action a s . The outcome of the game then is that the manager proposes D = (a s , (π s − S s , S s )) at t=0, which the VC accepts. This is because for any κ = (a s , (π s − s, s)) = D, either u m (κ, .) < 0 or u vc (κ, .) < 0. The payoffs to the VC and the manager are S s and π s − S s , respectively.
Similarly in state θ h , the manager and the VC agree on action a r (the key here is that π rh ≥ π s . Suppose this weren't the case, then the players would have agreed on action a r only if S s ≤ π rh ). The bargaining game then has a unique SPE that is also stationary. Following the same logic as in proof of Claim 11 above (with π s replacing L, and S s replacing Y ), defineŜ ≡ (1 − ρ) π rh −ρ (C − π s ). Payoffs to the VC and the manager are π rh − max Ŝ − S s , 0 and max Ŝ − S s , 0 , respectively.
Proof. (of Lemma 2(b)) Given D = (a r , (π rj + C − S rj , S rj )) in state θ j . In state θ l , by the same argument used in the proof of Lemma 1, it is evident that the two players agree on action a s . The bargaining game then has a unique SPE that is also stationary. Following the same logic as in proof of Claim 10 above (with π rl + C replacing L, and S rl replacing Y ), we obtain that the payoffs to the VC and the manager are S rl + ρ (π s − π rl − C) and
Similarly in state θ h , the manager and the VC agree on action a r .The outcome of the game then is that the manager proposes D = (a r , (π rh + C − S rh , S rh )) at t=0, which the VC accepts. This is because for any κ = (a r , (π rh + C − s, s)) = D, either u m (κ, .) < 0 or u vc (κ, .) < 0. The payoffs to the VC and the manager are S rh and π rh + C − S rh , respectively.
Proof. (of Lemma 3) Contracts with manager control can be of the following types: (a) renegotiation-proof contracts, or (b) contracts requiring renegotiation in state θ l .
(a) Renegotiation-proof contracts: Such a contract must induce the manager to choose action a s in state θ l and action a r in state θ h . Therefore,
Feasibility of the contract requires that I + m ≤ E (S). Therefore, such a contract is feasible only if
(b) Contracts requiring renegotiation in state θ l : The terms of this contract are such that the manager is always induced to choose action a r . Therefore, π rh −S rh +C ≥ π s −S s and π rl −S rl +C > π s −S s . In state θ l , the manager and the VC renegotiate the original contract, with D = (a r , (π rl − S rl + C, S rl )) as the disagreement point. From Lemma 2(b), the outcome of this renegotiation is that the firm chooses a s . The payoffs to the VC and the manager are S rl +ρ (π s − π rl − C) and π s −S rl −ρ (π s − π rl − C), respectively. Therefore, in this case,
Comparing conditions (16) and (17), and noting that π s −C > π rl +ρ (π s − π rl − C), it is evident that manager control is feasible if and only if qπ rh + (1 − q) (π s − C) = K m ≥ I+m. (To see the sufficiency part, notice that if K m ≥ I+m, then the contract S (x, a r ) = x, S (x, a s ) = πs −C πs x, with manager control is feasible and implements the first-best action plan.)
Proof. (of Lemma 4) When the VC is in control, it can force action a s on the firm at date 1 before θ is revealed. The VC will be inclined to do so if S s > qS rh + (1 − q) S s − m, i.e., if S s > S rh − m q . The manager and the VC can renegotiate to persuade the VC to wait till θ is revealed; this can be done by increasing S rh . However, if S s > π rh − m q , then renegotiation won't succeed, because limited liability requires that S rh ≤ π rh . So it is necessary that S s ≤ π rh − m q . The expected payoff to the VC is given by, E (S) = qS rh + (1 − q) S s ≤ qπ rh + (1 − q) π rh − m q = K vc where the inequality follows from the above discussion. Feasibility of the contract requires that I + m ≤ E (S) ≤ K vc . Hence, a contract with VC control is first-best efficient only if K vc ≥ I + m.
To see the sufficiency of the condition K vc ≥ I + m, consider the contract S (x, a r ) = x, S (x, a s ) = π rh − m q πs x. Under such a contract, S rh = π rh , S s = π rh − m q and S rl = π rl . Then, S s ≤ qS rh + (1 − q) S s − m. Therefore, the VC will wait for θ to be revealed.
It only remains to be shown that the VC chooses the first-best action plan after θ is revealed, i.e., that S rh ≥ S s ≥ S rl . It is obvious that S rh ≥ S s . As for the second inequality, Assumption 2(a) implies that π rh − m q > π s − C, and Assumption 1(a) implies that π s − C > π rl . Combining these two inequalities, we obtain S s = π rh − m q > π rl = S rl . This concludes the proof of sufficiency as well.
Proof. (of Lemma 6) Lemma 1 says that if the VC forces renegotiation in state θ h , it gets a payoff of π rh − max Ŷ − L , 0 . Instead, if it does not intervene, it gets a payoff of S rh . So the VC will intervene in state θ h if and only if π rh − max Ŷ − L , 0 exceeds S rh . Therefore, under joint control, the VC's payoff in state θ h can be at most π rh .
Similarly, if the VC intervenes in state θ l , it gets a payoff of Y + ρ (π s − L). If π rl − S rl + C > π s − S s , the VC will intervene, because otherwise the manager will choose the inefficient action a r . If S s ≤ π s − (π rl − S rl ) − C ≤ π s − C, the VC will intervene if and only if Y + ρ (π s − L) exceeds S s . Therefore, under joint control, the VC's payoff in state θ l can be at most max {(π s − C) , L + ρ (π s − L)}.
Therefore, the expected payoff to the VC under joint control is E (S) ≤ K j = qπ rh + (1 − q) max {(π s − C) , L + ρ (π s − L)}. Feasibility of the contract requires that K j ≥ I +m.
To see sufficiency of the condition K j ≥ I+m, consider the following contract: S γ (x, a r ) = x, S γ (x, a s ) = πs−C πa
x, Y γ = L. In state θ h , the manager chooses the efficient action a r ; the VC does not intervene, and gets a payoff of π rh . In state θ l , the VC intervenes if and only if L + ρ (π s − L) exceeds π s − C; its payoff is max {(π s − C) , L + ρ (π s − L)}. Since E (S) = K j ≥ I + m, the contract is feasible.
Proof. (of Proposition 7) If K vc ≥ I + m, VC control implements the efficient action plan (Lemma 4). On the other hand, if I + m > K j , then joint control is not feasible (Lemma 6). In either of these cases, joint control can't strictly dominate individual control. Hence, it is necessary that I + m ∈ (K vc , K j ] (Condition 2). Proof. (of Remark 8) When manager control is infeasible and VC control is inefficient, it must be that K vc < I + m (Lemmas 3 and 4). I will prove by contradiction that the control allocation ψ h = M, ψ l = V cannot feasibly implement the efficient action plan. Suppose it can.
(i) The manager retains control of the firm if γ = h. Consider the state (θ = θ l , γ = h). The manager needs to be compensated for her control rents C that she forgoes by choosing a s . As discussed in Lemma 3, the VC's payoff in the state (θ = θ l , γ = h) cannot exceed π s − C.
(ii) The VC gets control of the firm if γ = l is realized. The VC will force action a s on the firm unless S l s ≤ q l (α) π rh + (1 − q l (α)) S l s − m, i.e., unless S l s ≤ π rh − m q l (α) < π rh − m q (since q l (α) < q).
Therefore, it must be that, E (S) < qπ rh + (1 − q) (1 − α) (π s − C) + α π rh − m q < K vc < I + m Contradiction; the contract is infeasible.
Proof. (of Lemma 9) (i) Suppose the control allocation ψ h = M, ψ l = V implements the second-best action plan. Consider the event (θ = θ l , γ = h) which occurs with probability (1 − q) (1 − α); since γ = h, the manager has the control right. The manager may be reluctant to choose the efficient action a s , unless she is compensated for the control rents she forgoes by doing so. As discussed in Lemma 3, the VC can obtain a payoff of at most π s − C in the event (θ = θ l , γ = h). (ii) Similarly, with the control allocation ψ h = J, ψ l = V , consider the event (θ = θ l , γ = h), when the control right is jointly held by the manager and the VC. Then, as discussed in Lemma 6, the VC's payoff in this event is at most L + ρ (π s − L) or π s − C, whichever is higher.
Therefore,
So if K jv < I + m, then E (S) < I + m, and the contract is infeasible. Hence the control allocation ψ h = J, ψ l = V implements the second-best action plan if and only if K jv ≥ I + m. (If K jv ≥ I + m, then the following contract implements the second-best action plan: S h (x, a r ) = S l (x, a r ) = x, S h (x, a s ) = πs−C πs x, S l (x, a s ) = x, and Y γ = L)
